The moral and political philosophy of Hayek is based on his epistemological achievements. As many thinkers acknowledge, 1 his entire research effort is concerned with an investigation of the nature of human knowledge and its relation to society. In the preceding chapter it has been shown that, in his early years at the University of Vienna, Hayek was influenced by the philosophies of Mach, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, Windelband, Rickert and the Austrian School of Economics. As a result, his epistemic view is a combination of positivism and Southwestern neo-Kantianism. This chapter has the difficult task of reconstructing Hayek's theory of knowledge and examining its philosophical consequences. In doing so, it reveals the anti-rationalist character of Hayek's concept of morality and its epistemological foundation.
In what follows it is suggested that Hayek's epistemology is grounded on an inclusive ontological monism. This monism consists of an incomplete identification of the human mind with the physical order of the external environment. Hayek does not completely identify the human mind with the physical order of the external environment because, in his view, the substance of mind cannot be considered as a physiological mechanism that is identical with the physiological mechanism of body, i.e. the mechanism that represents the physical order of the external environment. Hayek's incomplete identification of the human mind with the physical order of the external environment does not undermine his monism because, in his theory, the substance of mind is still natural and not metaphysical. him to introduce a concept of practical dualism. The latter refers to a gnostic autonomy of the mental order from the physical events which determine its ontological nature. Hayek's practical dualism can be seen as a reconstruction of Rickert's distinction between a form and a content of knowledge through which neo-Kantian agnosticism is being introduced. As has been said, neo-Kantian agnosticism consists of the epistemological argument that things in themselves are not a possible subject of knowledge. The content of things cannot be rationally determined. For Hayek this agnosticism constitutes a hypothesis that is eventually verified by means of a physiological approach to the human mind. The latter is based on the monistic premises of Hayek's ontology. Hence, the natural limits of human knowledge are 'demonstrated' within the epistemological framework of a physiological psychology.
It is pointed out that the 'demonstration' of the natural limits of human knowledge in terms of a physiological psychology results in the 'objective' formation of Hayek's subjectivism. In fact, that is the formation of Hayek's view of subjective knowledge on the basis of positivism. The physiological 'demonstration' of the natural limits of human knowledge, on the one hand, constitutes the core of Hayek's epistemology and, on the other, the ground on which his concept of morality is developed. This concept is concerned with the respect of those limits and is incompatible with any idea of objective evaluation of complex phenomena. Hayek claims to respect the natural limits of human knowledge because he considers the spontaneous and evolutionary process of nature to be an objective source of morality.
The inclusive ontological monism of Hayek's theory of knowledge
This section investigates the ontological grounds of Hayek's theory of knowledge and thereby identifies the very first theoretical stage in the development of his epistemological and moral argument. That is the stage of ontological monism .
It might be argued that the ontological monism on the basis of which Hayek forms his epistemological account is introduced at the beginning of his work in theoretical psychology, i.e. The Sensory Order . There, he seems to doubt the ontological grounds of Cartesian metaphysical dualism (Descartes, 1994, p. 35) by treating the relation between mind and body in terms of a broad naturalism. According to Hayek, such a relation can be described 'by questions of what is mind? or what is the place of mind in the realm of nature? ' (Hayek, 1952, p. 1; italics added) .
